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Abstract
We present an analysis of some considerations involved in expressing the Gene Ontol-
ogy (GO) as a machine-processible ontology, reﬂecting principles of formal ontology.
GO is a controlled vocabulary that is intended to facilitate communication between
biologists by standardizing usage of terms in database annotations. Making such
controlled vocabularies maximally useful in support of bioinformatics applications
requires explicating in machine-processible form the implicit background informa-
tion that enables human users to interpret the meaning of the vocabulary terms.
In the case of GO, this process would involve rendering the meanings of GO into
a formal (logical) language with the help of domain experts, and adding additional
information required to support the chosen formalization. A controlled vocabulary
augmented in these ways is commonly called an ontology.I nt h i sp a p e r ,w em a k ea
modest exploration to determine the ontological requirements for this extended ver-
sion of GO. Using the terms within the three GO hierarchies (molecular function,
biological process and cellular component), we investigate the facility with which
GO concepts can be ontologized, using available tools from the philosophical and
ontological engineering literature. Copyright  2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Introduction
The rapidly increasing wealth of genomic data has
driven the development of computer systems to
assist in the biologist’s task of correlating related
knowledge about genes, their products and their
functions [8]. Gene products must be annotated
according to generally accepted and coherent the-
ories of biology.
We feel that there are beneﬁts to expressing these
theories as ontologies that are both (a) formalized
in machine-processible language and (b) reﬂect
principles of formal ontology (e.g. [11]). The
utility of ontologies in bioinformatics is well
accepted [12], and formalization of ontologies
allows the use of computers to verify internal con-
sistency and consistency with available data [6].
Indeed, formalization of GO is being pursued
by the GONG project [3]. The utility of apply-
ing formal ontology to bioinformatics problems is
more speculative, in that the relevant principles
have been introduced from philosophy relatively
recently (e.g. [5]), but we feel that formal ontol-
ogy suggests essential domain-independent orga-
nizing principles.
We explore examples of applying some of these
principles to GO, with a view toward improv-
ing GO’s consistency and general applicability to
automated processing of biological data. After a
brief introduction to GO, we seek to classify GO
terms according to groups of mutually disjoint
ontological categories, such as universal (classes
and relationships) vs. individual object, or contin-
uant (everyday objects) vs. occurrent (events or
processes) and their organization by higher-order
properties (e.g. ‘species’). We attempt to uncover
the semantics of the GO relations is-a and part-of.
We conclude with future directions for this work.
The Gene Ontology (GO)
GO [1] is a source of generally accepted biologi-
cal theory of considerable breadth. GO, the product
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of a consortium of researchers working on several
model organism databases, has the stated goal, ‘to
provide a set of structured vocabularies for speciﬁc
biological domains that can be used to describe
gene products in any organism’, to ‘facilitate com-
munication between people and organizations’ [2].
GO’s scope is larger and its structure more complex
than many other classiﬁcation schemes [9]; thus, it
provides a rich resource for a project seeking to
ontologize biological theory.
The GO Consortium states, ‘Curatorially, it will
be increasingly difﬁcult to maintain the seman-
tic consistency we desire without software tools
that perform consistency checks and controlled
updates’, and notes that ‘Many molecular func-
tions and biological processes do not exist in all
organisms’ [2]. Both of these concerns can be
addressed to some extent by an ontology that can
apply different rules (statements about the way the
world works) to different species, and which checks
for semantic consistency between all of the rules
expressed in the ontology.
Discussion
We seek to ontologize the semantics of GO, as
implied by its documentation and content. The GO
consists of three sets of terms (cellular compo-
nent, molecular function and biological process),
arranged in directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), con-
nected by ‘is-a’ and ‘part-of’ relations. (DAGs are
distinct from hierarchies, in that each term in a
DAG may have more than one parent term; how-
ever, we use the colloquial ‘hierarchy’ equivalently
to ‘DAG’ in this work.)
Basic ontological distinctions
Universal vs. individual
GO terms represent abstractions. The cellular com-
ponent ontology, for example, models the general
structure of eukaryotic cells [1], rather than any
actual individual cells. Such terms are typically
taken to name properties — a kind of universal
that accounts for the common structure of objects.
Properties may be exempliﬁed or instantiated by
objects, while individuals may not [7]. Since each
GO term may be instantiated by some real-world
object, e.g. the term Cell could be instantiated by
some actual cell in a Petri dish, we know that GO
terms cannot be individuals.
Continuant vs. occurrent
The cellular component hierarchy contains terms
representing kinds of physical objects (e.g. ‘den-
drite’), whereas the biological process and molecu-
lar function hierarchies contain terms representing
events (e.g. ‘budding’). Physical objects (continu-
ants) should be distinguished from events (occur-
rents) in order to account for their different ways
of behaving, e.g. events can only have physical
objects as participants in the event, not as parts
of the event (which could only be sub-events).
For example, ‘ubiquitin ligase complex’ (a cellular
component) would be represented as a participant
in ‘protein ubiquitylation’ (a biological process),
not as a part of it.
GO relations
The semantics of ‘is-a’
The relation of subsumption captures the notion
that one property is more general than another (e.g.
‘cell subsumes eukaryotic cell’), whereas instanti-
ation reﬂects that an entity exempliﬁes a property
(‘my cat is an instance of cat’). We note that ‘is-
a’ relates only GO terms (already determined to
be properties), and that its behaviour is transitive
(e.g. if lipoprotein antitoxin is a kind of antitoxin,
and antitoxin is a kind of molecular function, then
lipoprotein antitoxin is a kind of molecular func-
tion). Therefore, we take the intended meaning
to be subsumption between properties, rather than
instantiation of properties.
The semantics of ‘part-of’
The intended meaning of ‘part-of’ can be found in
the GO Usage Guide [4]: part-of indicates ‘can be
a part of ’, NOT ‘is always a part of ’. The most
natural reading of ‘part-of’ is that ‘Property A is
part-of Property B only when, for instances a of
A and b of B,i ti spossible that a is part of b’.
This is distinct from a subsumption relationship, in
which, if Property A is subsumed by Property B,
all instances of A are necessarily instances of B.
The behaviour of ‘part-of’ is deﬁned as transitive.
Perusing GO shows examples of ‘part-of’ used for
representation of, at least, parts (steps) of processes,
parts of functions, and physical parts, as well as in
each of the following kinds of conceptualizations:
• ‘A membrane is a part of (any) cell’.
• ‘A ﬂagellum is part of (some) cells’.
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• ‘A replication fork is part of the nucleoplasm
(only during certain times of the cell cycle)’.
Each variant of this variety of usages should ideally
be represented as a different ‘ﬂavour’ of ‘part-of’;
however, until these semantics can be formalized,
a very general representation of ‘part-of’ is needed.
Non-rooted terms
Examination of the GO ontologies (July 2002
release) shows that about 1200 terms lack an ‘is-
a’ parent, e.g. ‘inner membrane’ is part-of ‘mem-
brane’ but is not subsumed by anything. Therefore,
it lacks a ‘deﬁnition’, in the sense that ‘the def-
inition of a concept becomes the [subsumption]
path from its own node to the root node of the
ontology’ [10]. Because each term is semantically
rooted in its GO hierarchy, we can automatically
subsume terms with ‘cellular component’, ‘molec-
ular function’ or ‘biological process’ (e.g. ‘mem-
brane’ would be subsumed by ‘cellular compo-
nent’). This ‘rooting’ of properties is not a require-
ment of formal ontology; however, we ﬁnd that the
process of ontologization encourages more com-
plete deﬁnition of properties.
Higher-order properties
Implied higher-order properties
Just as individual objects (‘my cat Fluffy’) may be
grouped under a property (‘Cat’), properties may
likewise be grouped under properties. These latter
properties are called higher-order properties, and
in general are called higher-order relations (e.g.
subsumption) if they relate properties or relations.
Gathering collections of properties into higher-
order properties allows the modelling of such
concepts as species:
• ‘Spot’ is an instance of Canis familiaris.
• C. familiaris is an instance of the higher-order
property Species.
• (But ‘Spot’ is not an instance of Species!).
Higher-order properties are implied by the structure
of GO, e.g. every term in the cellular compo-
nent hierarchy represents, naturally, a kind of cel-
lular component, such as ‘membrane’. We can
therefore identify each cellular component term
as an instance of cellular-component-kind (sim-
ilarly for molecular-function-kind and biological-
process-kind). This facilitates modelling tasks such
as indicating that plant cells and animal cells have
different kinds of cellular components.
Higher-order properties enable us to specify cer-
tain relations that are relevant for certain kinds of
entities, such as modelling the kinds of processes
that are restricted to certain kindsof cellularcompo-
nents. For example, we generalize our observation
that each individual photosynthesis reaction takes
place in the thylakoid compartment of an individ-
ual cell; it is in fact the case that the kind of process
called photosynthesis always takes place in the kind
of cellular component called thylakoid.
Types
There is another formal aspect of molecular func-
tion, cellular component and biological process
terms. An instance of a cellular component, e.g. a
particular nucleus, is expected to remain a nucleus
and to be distinguishable from other nuclei. The
ontology in [5] identiﬁes such non-varying (in for-
mal ontological terms, ‘rigid’) and distinguishable
(‘identity-carrying’) entities as instances of the
higher-order property Type. We believe that molec-
ular function and biological process properties are
also distinguishable and rigid, therefore molecu-
lar function and biological process properties will
also be instances of Type. Ideally, every real-world
object will instantiate some Type, which serves as
a source of distinguishing identity characteristics
for the object.
Proposed future directions
There are a few difﬁculties with GO that could
be remedied by knowledge-intensive reformula-
tion and/or extension. For example, the GO Usage
Guide [4] states that the following must be true:
If A is part of B, and C is an instance of B, is A part of
C? — YES.
Examining the Gene Ontology, one sees such
cases as:
Axon is part-of Cell, and Ascus is an ‘instance of’ (i.e.
subsumed by) Cell, therefore Axon is part-of Ascus.
Since an Ascus is a fungal cell, it is not possible
that Axon (part of a neuron) can even potentially be
part of it. This problem also exists for Glycosome
(part of Kinetoplastida cells), Viral Tegument (part
of viral particles), etc.
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Possible solutions include extending the cellu-
lar ontology to include the needed speciﬁc kinds
of cells: e.g. Neuron, of which Axon may be
a part; and Kinetoplastida-cell, of which Glyco-
some may be a part. Creating a kind-of-cell (e.g.
neuron, muscle cell) ontology would be help-
ful; but rather than proliferating such properties
as Kinetoplastida-cell, Mammalian-cell, Chordate-
cell, it would make more sense to additionally cre-
ate a zoological ontology which would be referred
to in statements such as, ‘glycosome can be part
of a cell for Kinetoplastidae’. The utility of this
extension is evident; variability between organisms
is so great that it is necessary to restrict statements
to speciﬁc organisms, e.g. ‘notochord is found in
some developmental stage in chordates.’
Further ontologization based on GO would likely
include such extensions as:
• Formalize the different semantics of the ‘annota-
tion’ relation between gene products and kinds of
GO terms; e.g. the relation between a gene prod-
uct and a cellular component might be ‘active-
in-component’ [2].
• Enrich GO’s ontological content to extend
its capabilities, e.g. an ontology of biological
substances could be used to infer that
‘macromolecule’ subsumes ‘polysaccharide’,
which subsumes ‘chitin’. Therefore, ‘chitin
catabolism’ could be automatically inferred to
be a kind of ‘macromolecule metabolism’, rather
than the curator making all of these connections
manually. As more biological concepts are
represented formally, computer systems can
begin to assume more of the burden of
ontology curation by enforcing consistency in
the semantics of the ontology, as expressed in
concept hierarchies and in rules.
• The GO Usage Guide [4] states: ‘A biologi-
cal process is a biological goal that requires
more than one function’. This, and other, rela-
tions between the GO ontologies should be
developed, e.g. the relationship between ‘apop-
tosis inhibitor’ and ‘apoptosis inhibition’, or
between ‘ﬂagellum’ (cellular component) and
‘cellular motility’ (biological process). Knowl-
edge about where processes may take place
should be recorded, e.g. photosynthetic reactions
take place in thylakoid, as well as tempo-
ral associations, e.g. nucleolus reappearance is
associated with telophase of mitosis. These
between-hierarchy relations are characteristic of
ontologies and would allow the capture of more
biological knowledge.
This work consisted of an initial analysis of GO
terms and organization with respect to some com-
mon formal ontological notions. Future work would
include the actual formalization of some part of
GO in a logical language (and the potential use
of software to verify the internal semantic con-
sistency of the ontology), adding some extensions
to GO as suggested by the ontological analysis,
and examining GO with respect to other aspects of
formal ontological theory (e.g. mereology, consti-
tution, granularity). Future analysis and extensions
will preferably be performed in consultation with
experienced GO users and GO experts.
In conclusion, projects directed toward extend-
ing the computational capabilities of bioinformat-
ics systems have a tremendously valuable starting
point in the GO. Guidance provided by the disci-
pline of formal ontology can help such projects
make principled initial ontologization decisions
that support the intended semantics of GO.
References
1. Gene Ontology Consortium. 2000. Gene ontology: tool for the
uniﬁcation of biology. Nature Genet 25: 25–29.
2. Gene Ontology Consortium. 2001. Creating the gene ontology
resource: design and implementation. Genome Res 11:
1425–1433.
3. GONG Project: http://gong.man.ac.uk
4. GO Usage Guide: http://www.geneontology.org/GO.usage.
html
5. Guarino N, Welty C. 2000. Ontological analysis of taxonomic
relationships. In Proceedings of ER-2000. Laender A, Story V
(eds). Springer-Verlag LNCS: New York.
6. Karp PD. 2001. Pathway databases: a case study in
computational symbolic theories. Science 293: 2040–2044.
7. Loux MJ. 1998. Metaphysics: a Contemporary Introduction.
Routledge: New York.
8. Reed J. 2000. Trends in commercial bioinformatics. Oscar
Gruss Biotechnol Rev 13(March).
9. Rison SCG, Hodgman TC, Thornton JM. 2000. Comparison
of functional annotation schemes for genomes. Funct Integr
Genomics 1: 56–69.
10. Schulze-Kremer S. 1998. Ontologies for molecular biology. In
Paciﬁc Symposium on Biocomputing. AAAI Press: 695–706.
11. Simons P. 1987. Parts: a Study in Ontology. Oxford
University Press: Oxford.
12. Stevens R, Goble C, Bechhofer S. 2000. Ontology-based
knowledge representation for bioinformatics. Brief Bioinform
1(4): 398–414.
Copyright  2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Comp Funct Genom 2003; 4: 90–93.